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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WAYMO LLC,
Plaintiff,
    v.
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.;
OTTOMOTTO LLC; and OTTO
TRUCKING LLC,
Defendants.
                                                                     /
No. C 17-00939 WHA
ORDER RE JURY
INSTRUCTION ON 
DAMAGES BASED 
ONLY ON ACQUISITION
INTRODUCTION
In this action for trade secret misappropriation, no recovery theory will go to the jury for
damages based solely on misappropriation by acquisition only.  This order explains why.
STATEMENT
After two continuances of the trial date and in advance of the third final pretrial
conference, the judge asked the parties the following questions (Dkt. No. 2404):
Do both sides agree that acquisition alone can be enough to
support an unjust enrichment award under both CUTSA and
DTSA?  The Court had understood that Waymo’s unjust
enrichment theory in our case depended on use or disclosure.  Has
Waymo preserved an unjust enrichment theory based on
acquisition alone?
Both sides responded and had an opportunity to respond to each other’s briefs.  After
considering the parties’ written submissions, this order concludes Waymo failed to preserve a
damages theory based on acquisition alone.  Accordingly, the jury will be instructed, in effect,
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2
that while acquisition alone can legally support a damages claim, Waymo is precluded from
relying on such a theory by reason of its failure to preserve it.
ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) requires a party to provide “a
computation of each category of damages claimed.”  FRCP 37(c)(1) prohibits a party from
using at trial information not properly disclosed under FRCP 26(a) “unless the failure was
substantially justified or is harmless.”  
Here, both sides agree that, as a general proposition of trade secret law, acquisition
alone (as distinct from acquisition followed by use or disclosure) can support a claim for
damages (Dkt. Nos. 2406-2 at 1, 2405 at 1).  They disagree, however, as to whether or not
Waymo actually preserved a damages theory based on acquisition alone.  Waymo cannot point
to a single place amidst all the myriad submissions in this action, including in its initial
disclosures, where it did.  Nor has Waymo shown that its failure to disclose an acquisition-only
damages theory was substantially justified or is harmless.  Its numerous arguments in briefing
on this issue fail to come to grips with this simple fact.
First, Waymo points out that its corrected supplemental initial disclosures and the
parties’ joint pretrial order identified no specific theory of damages (Dkt. Nos. 2406-2 at 1,
2411-3 at 9).  Thus, Waymo reasons, there are no limits on what theories it may assert,
including one based solely on acquisition.  Insofar as Waymo suggests the parties’ joint pretrial
order somehow supersedes and cures any deficiencies in its initial disclosures under FRCP
26(a), it cites no authority and this order rejects the suggestion.  In addition, merely showing
that Waymo did not explicitly rule out the possibility of an acquisition-only damages theory
does not further show that Waymo ever articulated, disclosed, or preserved any such theory.
Second, Waymo contends mere acquisition can confer “improper competitive benefits”
beyond actual use of trade secret information (see Dkt. Nos. 2406-2 at 2, 2411-3 at 7–9).  This
general proposition is true as far as it goes, but Waymo has identified no such theory against
defendants here.  Waymo points to its responses to defendants’ interrogatory numbers 13 and
28, wherein Waymo asserted that only the value of its misappropriated trade secrets could
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explain Uber’s acquisition of Otto (see Dkt. Nos. 2406-2 at 2–3, 2411-3 at 8–9).  In a similar
vein, Waymo cites the deposition testimony of John Bares, who agreed that, hypothetically,
having access to Waymo’s trade secrets would be useful for someone trying to build a medium-
range LiDAR system (see Dkt. No. 2406-2 at 3–4).  Waymo construes this to mean that Uber
“saw value in acquiring the trade secrets even if it never actually used them” (id. at 4 (emphasis
in original)).  This is a non sequitur.  The evidence disclosed and cited by Waymo arguably
shows that Uber saw value in acquiring the trade secrets because it expected to benefit from
actually using them.  It in no way shows that Uber believed it would benefit from merely
acquiring the trade secrets even if it never actually used them.
Third, Waymo contends “knowledge of a negative trade secret can also confer benefits
apart from ‘use’” (id. at 4–6).  Again, the general proposition is true but fails to support
Waymo’s position.  Of course, a defendant need not copy the underlying technology to use the
misappropriated trade secret.  For example, a defendant might use a negative know-how trade
secret by taking its lesson to avoid developing apparently fruitless technology.  Such theories,
however, remain grounded in defendants’ alleged use of trade secrets — not mere acquisition. 
Thus, contrary to Waymo, it did not preserve an acquisition-only damages theory by alleging
that defendants misappropriated negative know-how.
Fourth, Waymo claims mere acquisition of trade secrets can “confer unjust benefits
through the improper acquisition of control over that information.”  Waymo quotes extensively
from three non-binding decisions for the proposition that there is “real harm to a trade secret
owner from loss of control over its property and . . . corresponding real benefits accrue to the
misappropriator from gaining such control, regardless of whether the misappropriator actually
uses or discloses the underlying information” (id. at 6–8).  None of the quoted language,
however, said anything of the sort.  See Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Sys. Lab. Inc., 226 Cal.
App. 4th 26, 53–56 (2014) (explaining why a set of ideas qualified for trade secret protection);
AT&T Commc’ns v. Pac. Bell, No. C 96-1691 CRB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13459, at *6–7
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 1998) (Judge Charles Breyer) (finding “commercial use” where defendants
referenced misappropriated trade secrets but failed to complete their plans to capitalize on
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them); ATS Prods., Inc. v. Champion Fiberglass, Inc., No. C 13–02403 SI, 2014 WL 466016, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2014) (Judge Susan Illston) (denying motion to dismiss misappropriation
claim because “the Court [could not] say that there is no set of facts by which [plaintiff] may
prove injury”).  Waymo’s misinterpretation of non-binding authorities aside, its citation to its
response to defendants’ interrogatory number 28 makes clear that its “loss of dominion” theory
remains grounded in defendants’ alleged disclosure, not mere acquisition, of trade secrets (see
Dkt. No. 2406-2 at 8–9).  Again, the problem remains that Waymo failed to preserve a damages
theory based on acquisition alone (as distinct from acquisition followed by use or disclosure).
Fifth, Waymo contends it can sometimes be difficult to draw the line between
acquisition and use of trade secret information, and asserts without explanation that there is
“little practical difference” in this case (id. at 9–10; see also Dkt. No. 2411-3 at 1–7).  Thus, by
its own admission, Waymo seeks a separate jury instruction regarding acquisition-only damages
only in the “unlikely event” that it fails to prove disclosure or use (Dkt. No. 2406-2 at 9).  No
interpretation of this tortured reasoning makes sense.  Of course Waymo will be allowed at trial
to attempt to prove defendants’ acquisition of trade secrets followed by use or disclosure.  But if
Waymo’s acquisition theory is so inextricably bound up in its use and disclosure theories that
Waymo did not need to separately disclose the former, then its failure to prove the latter at trial
would also prove fatal to the former.  If, on the other hand, Waymo’s acquisition theory is
sufficiently distinct from its use and disclosure theories to warrant a separate jury instruction on
acquisition-only damages, then Waymo needed to disclose that theory and its failure to do so
necessitates preclusion.  Perhaps Waymo hopes that the mysterious option of “acquisition-only
damages,” untethered to any facts in our case, will sufficiently confuse jurors that they might
award Waymo something even if it fails at trial to prove use or disclosure.  We will not
entertain such a gimmick.
Sixth, Waymo points out at length that, under general tort principles, damages can be
proximately caused by trade secret misappropriation even without actual, full use of the
underlying technology.  Thus, Waymo argues, it need not prove that defendants made actual,
full use of its trade secrets in order to hold them liable for damages (Dkt. No. 2411-3 at 1–6). 
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Waymo’s abstract proposition is true as far as it goes, but its argument attacks a strawman. 
Defendants do not dispute that it is generally possible for a plaintiff to disclose, pursue, and
preserve a damages theory based on something other than actual, full use of misappropriated
trade secrets.  Defendants’ point is that Waymo has not done so here.  This order agrees.
Seventh, Waymo suggests the Court already rejected defendants’ arguments on this
issue because a previous order dated November 2, 2017, denied their motion to strike Waymo’s
initial disclosures (id. at 10–11).  That order excluded Waymo’s damages expert, restricted its
ability to use certain financial evidence at trial, and then stated, “With the benefit of Waymo’s
full damages theory and the foregoing rulings, this order finds that no further relief is necessary
under these circumstances to remedy any shortfalls in Waymo’s initial disclosures” (see Dkt.
No. 2176 at 16).  As defendants point out, the “full damages theory” espoused by Waymo’s
damages expert and considered by the November 2 order contained no acquisition-only
component.  Nor did that order, in declining to award relief above and beyond the exclusion of
Waymo’s damages expert and the restriction of its ability to present financial evidence at trial,
somehow bless the adequacy of Waymo’s initial disclosures.  Waymo’s suggestion to the
contrary is unfair.
In summary, throughout this litigation the only discernible damages theories preserved
by Waymo have been grounded in defendants’ alleged use or disclosure of trade secrets.  These
theories reference acquisition only insofar as it forms a logical prerequisite to use or disclosure. 
Waymo has never disclosed any theory as to acquisition-only damages, nor has it given the
Court or defendants any reason to think it was pursuing any such theory (see Dkt. No. 2404
(“The Court had understood that Waymo’s unjust enrichment theory in our case depended on
use or disclosure.”)).  Even in briefing on this very issue, Waymo could not articulate any
acquisition-only damages theory based on the facts of our case (as opposed to generic legal
principles and vague attorney arguments).  This order concludes Waymo failed to disclose an
acquisition-only damages theory as required by FRCP 26(a) and is precluded from asserting any
such theory at trial under FRCP 37(c)(1).  The jury instruction will conform to this holding.
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What seems to be going on here is that this civil action began with vehement accusations
that Uber had stolen Waymo’s alleged trade secrets and used them to jump-start Uber’s own
LiDAR development for its competing self-driving car program.  Yet subsequent discovery and
inspections, Uber contends, failed to reveal much, if any, such use.  Now, Waymo seeks to fall
back to the contingent argument that even if Uber did not use the trade secrets, Uber still stole
them and should pay.  The problem remains, however, that Waymo did not put Uber on notice
of this fallback position and Uber has not had a fair opportunity to organize its defenses around
this amorphous possibility.  Consequently, Waymo must be held to prove its showcase
contention — that Uber used or disclosed Waymo’s alleged trade secrets.  
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:  January 18, 2018.                                                                
WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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